广东工业大学学报 ›› 2017, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (05): 34-39,51.doi: 10.12052/gdutxb.170083

• 综合研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于古诺模型的产学研合作技术授权方式选择均衡研究

许治, 王书升, 陈志荣   

  1. 华南理工大学 工商管理学院, 广东 广州 510640
  • 收稿日期:2017-04-06 出版日期:2017-09-09 发布日期:2017-07-10
  • 作者简介:许治(1975-),男,教授,博士生导师,研究方向为科研与创新管理.E-mail:xuzhi@scut.edu.cn.
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助重点项目（71233003）

The Choice and Equilibrium of the Technology Licensing Mode of the Industry-University Research Collaboration Based on Cournot Model

Xu Zhi, Wang Shu-sheng, Chen Zhi-rong   

  1. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China
  • Received:2017-04-06 Online:2017-09-09 Published:2017-07-10

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摘要： 在古诺模型框架下，研究高校向两家技术水平不同的企业进行技术转让时，技术接收方选择与最优技术授权方式问题。研究表明：（1）如采用固定收费模式，高校向高技术水平企业转让技术受益更大；而在特许收费和双重收费模式中，高校对技术转让对象的选择是多元的，既可能向高研发投入企业转让，又可能向两家企业同时转让；（2）高校技术授权最优方式主要由接受技术的企业自身技术存量、企业的研发投入以及高校转让技术水平决定。

关键词: 技术授权, 古诺竞争, 社会福利

Abstract: In the framework of the Cournot model, a study is conducted on the choice of technology receivers and the optimal technology authorization when the university transfers technology to two enterprises with different technical levels. The research shows that:(1) if the fixed fee mode is adopted, the technology transfer from the university to the high-tech enterprise is more beneficial. In the royalty fee and double charging mode, the choice of the object of technology transfer is diverse:maybe it will transfer to the high R & D investment enterprise, and also to the two companies at the same time. The optimal technical authorization of colleges and universities is mainly determined by the technical stock of enterprises receiving technology, the R & D investment of enterprises and the technology transfer level of universities.

Key words: technology licensing, Cournot competition, social welfare

中图分类号: 

  • F276.42
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