广东工业大学学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (04): 35-40.doi: 10.12052/gdutxb.210003

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综合操作者与管理者行为博弈的系统收益分析方法研究

李莎莎1, 崔铁军2   

  1. 1. 辽宁工程技术大学 工商管理学院，辽宁 葫芦岛 125105;
    2. 辽宁工程技术大学 安全科学与工程学院，辽宁 葫芦岛 125105
  • 收稿日期:2021-01-06 出版日期:2021-07-10 发布日期:2021-05-25
  • 通信作者: 崔铁军(1983-)，男，副教授，博士，主要研究方向为系统故障过程及其智能分析方法，E-mail：ctj.159@163.com E-mail:ctj.159@163.com
  • 作者简介:李莎莎(1988-)，女，讲师，博士，主要研究方向为安全系统工程和系统可靠性
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(52004120)；辽宁省教育厅项目(LJ2020QNL018)；辽宁工程技术大学学科创新团队资助项目(LNTU20TD-31)

A Research on the Analysis Method of System Income Based on the Behavior Game Between Operators and Managers

Li Sha-sha1, Cui Tie-jun2   

  1. 1. College of Business Administration, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao 125105, China;
    2. College of Safety Science and Engineering, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao 125105, China
  • Received:2021-01-06 Online:2021-07-10 Published:2021-05-25

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摘要： 为研究类似工程管理系统中, 操作者和管理者采取不同行为博弈对系统层面收益的影响, 提出基于空间故障网络(Space Fault Network, SFN)和博弈论的系统收益分析方法。论述了系统中操作者和管理者的意义、界定和关系, 说明了SFN表示博弈过程的可行性。确定了方法的基本参数、基本参数与事件综合收益关系、博弈逻辑关系与系统收益。操作者有安全和不安全行为, 管理者有惩罚和奖励行为, 将操作者和管理者各种行为作用于事件后的事件综合收益, 经过与或逻辑演化最终得到系统收益, 并判断收益博弈胜出者。最后通过实例分析说明了方法的流程、作用和适用性, 为研究系统收益博弈过程提供方法。

关键词: 安全系统工程, 博弈论, 两者博弈, 空间故障网络, 系统收益分析

Abstract: To study the influence of different behaviors of operators and managers in similar engineering management systems on the system level profit, an analysis method of system profit based on space fault network (SFN) and game theory is proposed. Firstly, the significance, definition and relationship of operators and managers in the system are discussed. The feasibility of SFN representing game process is shown. The basic parameters of the method, the relationship between the basic parameters and the event comprehensive profit, the game logic relationship and the system profit are determined. Operators have safe and unsafe behaviors, and managers have punishment and reward behaviors. After the operators and managers act on the event comprehensive profit, the system profit is finally obtained through and/or logical evolution, and the winner of the profit game is judged. Finally, the flow, function and applicability of the method are illustrated by an example. A method is provided for studying the process of system profit game.

Key words: safety system engineering, game theory, two game, space fault network, system profit analysis

中图分类号: 

  • F224
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