我国智能手机产业组建专利池的演化博弈分析

doi:10.12052/gdutxb.160183

广东工业大学学报 ›› 2017, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (03): 72-76.doi: 10.12052/gdutxb.160183

• 大数据基础理论与应用专题 • 上一篇下一篇

我国智能手机产业组建专利池的演化博弈分析

钟映竑, 李平

广东工业大学管理学院, 广东广州 510520

收稿日期:2016-12-27 出版日期:2017-05-09 发布日期:2017-05-09
作者简介:钟映竑(1970-),男,副教授,博士,主要研究方向为供应链管理、演化博弈论.
基金资助:
广东省知识产权局软科学项目（116742）

An Evolution Game Analysis of the Formation of a Patent Pool of Chinese Smart Phone Industry

Zhong Ying-hong, Li Ping

School of Management, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520, China

Received:2016-12-27 Online:2017-05-09 Published:2017-05-09

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

专利对智能手机产业的发展至关重要，也是我国智能手机产业的短板，组建专利池是应对国外专利围堵的有效途径.本文运用演化博弈方法来分析组建专利池的影响因素，并探索组建专利池的策略.在对我国智能手机专利领域的战略环境进行全面分析的基础上，构建了一个我国智能手机产业专利池组建问题的演化博弈模型，针对组建手机专利池的影响因素进行了分析.所得结论为要成功组建专利池，各智能手机厂商须建立利益与成本共担机制，政府应适当补贴企业由于创新行为而蒙受的损失，减少组建专利池的政策成本，并提高期望收益.

关键词: 智能手机产业, 专利池, 演化博弈模型

Abstract:

Patents, the short board of Chinese smart phone firms, play important role in the development of smart phone industry. To construct a patent pool is an effective approach to break the patent containment of foreign companies. The impact factors of constructing a patent pool are analyzed and some strategies explored by employing evolutionary game theory. An evolutionary game model about patent pool of domestic smart phone industry is built up based on comprehensive analysis of its strategic environment. Some impact factors of the model are analyzed. It is concluded that the benefit and cost sharing mechanism should be built for all participants of patent pool and the government should provide the smart phone firms with some subsidies to compensate their costs of innovation and reduce the policy costs of constructing patent tool as well as improve their expected benefits in order to build a patent pool successfully.

Key words: smart phone industry, patent pool, evolutionary game model

中图分类号:

F270

钟映竑, 李平. 我国智能手机产业组建专利池的演化博弈分析[J]. 广东工业大学学报, 2017, 34(03): 72-76.

Zhong Ying-hong, Li Ping. An Evolution Game Analysis of the Formation of a Patent Pool of Chinese Smart Phone Industry[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Technology, 2017, 34(03): 72-76.

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我国智能手机产业组建专利池的演化博弈分析

An Evolution Game Analysis of the Formation of a Patent Pool of Chinese Smart Phone Industry

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