广东工业大学学报 ›› 2017, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (04): 52-57.doi: 10.12052/gdutxb.160105

• 综合研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于累积前景理论与演化博弈论的电商平台监管策略研究

陈海霞, 钟映竑   

  1. 广东工业大学 管理学院, 广东 广州 510520
  • 收稿日期:2016-08-20 出版日期:2017-07-09 发布日期:2017-07-09
  • 通信作者: 钟映竑(1970–),男,副教授,硕士生导师,主要研究方向为管理科学与工程、物流系统工程.E-mail:zhongyinghong E-mail:zhongyinghong@126.com
  • 作者简介:陈海霞(1991–),女,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为物流工程.

An E-commerce Platform Anti-counterfeiting Strategy Research Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory and Evolutionary Game Theory

Chen Hai-xia, Zhong Ying-hong   

  1. School of Management, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520, China
  • Received:2016-08-20 Online:2017-07-09 Published:2017-07-09

摘要:

从电商平台参与监管的角度出发,利用累积前景理论改进演化博弈方法,重新构建电商平台和线上商家的收益感知矩阵;在综合考虑双方利益的前提下引入奖金激励变量,进一步构建了奖金变动对线上商家销售策略选择的影响模型,并用系统动力学模型来进行检验,从而提出电商平台需合理运用奖金激励以及惩罚进行双向控制.本研究不仅解决了传统博弈模型的局限,还为电商平台的监管行动提供了一个可操作的方向.

关键词: 电商平台, 线上商家, 累积前景理论, 奖金激励, 系统动力学

Abstract:

Based on electric business platform participation anti-counterfeiting, cumulative prospect theory is used to improve evolution game method, building an electric business platform and an online seller benefit perception matrix. Considering the interests of both sides, bonus incentive variable is introduced, an online sellers sales strategy selection model under the bonus changes is built, and it is proposed that an e-commerce platform need rational use of financial incentives and penalties for the two-way control. Not only the limitations of traditional gaming models are solved, but an actionable anti-counterfeit direction for e-commerce platform is also provided.

Key words: e-commerce platform, online sellers, cumulative prospect theory, incentive bonuses, system dynamics

中图分类号: 

  • F224.32

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