Journal of Guangdong University of Technology ›› 2017, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (05): 34-39,51.doi: 10.12052/gdutxb.170083

Previous Articles     Next Articles

The Choice and Equilibrium of the Technology Licensing Mode of the Industry-University Research Collaboration Based on Cournot Model

Xu Zhi, Wang Shu-sheng, Chen Zhi-rong   

  1. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China
  • Received:2017-04-06 Online:2017-09-09 Published:2017-07-10

HTML

PDF (PC)

2631

Abstract: In the framework of the Cournot model, a study is conducted on the choice of technology receivers and the optimal technology authorization when the university transfers technology to two enterprises with different technical levels. The research shows that:(1) if the fixed fee mode is adopted, the technology transfer from the university to the high-tech enterprise is more beneficial. In the royalty fee and double charging mode, the choice of the object of technology transfer is diverse:maybe it will transfer to the high R & D investment enterprise, and also to the two companies at the same time. The optimal technical authorization of colleges and universities is mainly determined by the technical stock of enterprises receiving technology, the R & D investment of enterprises and the technology transfer level of universities.

Key words: technology licensing, Cournot competition, social welfare

CLC Number: 

  • F276.42
[1] MORTON I K, YAIR T. Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent[J]. Quaterly Journal of Economics, 1986, 101(3):471-491. [2] ERKAL N. Optimal licensing policy in differentiated industries[J]. Economic Record, 2005, 81(252):51-60. [3] KAMIEN M I, TAUMAN Y. Patent licensing:The inside story[J]. The Manchester School, 2002, 70(1):7-15. [4] WANG X H. Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model[J]. Economics Letters, 1998, 60(1):55-62. [5] LI C, GENG X. Licensing to a durable-good monopoly[J]. Economic Modelling, 2008, 25(5):876-884. [6] VISHWASRAO S. Royalties vs. fees:How do firms pay for foreign technology?[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 25(4):741-759. [7] FAULÍ-OLLER R, SANDONÍS J. To merge or to license:implications for competition policy[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003, 21(5):655-672. [8] FAULÍ-OLLER R, SANDONÍS J. Welfare reducing licensing[J]. Games & Economic Behavior, 2002, 41(2):192-205. [9] AULAKH P S, CAVUSGIL S T, SARKAR M. Compensation in international licensing agreements[J]. Journal of International Business Studies, 1998, 29(2):409-419. [10] CAVES R E, CROOKELL H, KILLING J P. The imperfect market for technology licenses[J]. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 1983, 45(3):249-267. [11] 李长英, 姜羽. Stackelberg竞争条件下的企业兼并与技术转让[J]. 世界经济文汇, 2006,(2):45-55.LI C Y, JIANG Y. Enterprise merger and technology transfer under Stackelberg competition[J]. World Economic Papers, 2006,(2):45-55. [12] 李长英, 宋娟. 政府在企业兼并与技术转让中的的策略选择[J]. 南开学报(哲学社会科学版), 2006,(1):125-132.LI C Y, SONG J. The strategic choice of government in enterprise merger and technology transfer[J]. Nankai Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2006,(1):125-132. [13] 李长英, 宋娟. 古诺竞争条件下异质品企业之间的兼并与技术转让[J]. 世界经济, 2006,(7):74-81.LI C Y, SONG J. Merger and technology transfer between heterogeneous firms under Cournot competition[J]. World Economy, 2006,(7):74-81. [14] ARORA A, FOSFURI A. Licensing the market for technology[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2003, 52(2):277-295. [15] ROCKETT K. The quality of licensed technology[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1990, 8(4):559-574. [16] LI C, SONG J. Technology licensing in a vertically differentiated duopoly[J]. Japan & the World Economy, 2009, 21(2):183-190.
No related articles found!
Viewed
Full text


Abstract

Cited
  Shared   
  Discussed   
No Suggested Reading articles found!
Copyright © 2017 Journal of Guangdong University of Technology
Add：729 East Dongfeng RD., Guangzhou PRC. Postcode: 510090
Tel：020-37626653,020-37626139,020-37626396
Email：xbzrb@gdut.edu.cn
Supported:Beijing Magtech